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ARTICLES
CLEANING METADATA ON THE
WORLD WIDE WEB: SUGGESTIONS
FOR A REGULATORY APPROACH
MARCEL GORDON

Where is the Life we have lost in living?
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

T. S. Eliot, Choruses from "The Rock" 1934.
Results 1 - 10 of about 9,310,000,000.
Google, 2006.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The World Wide Web has made an enormous amount of information
available to millions of users around the world. Web pages, knit together
by the ubiquitous hyperlink, form a dazzling multiverse of facts and
opinions, polemic and propaganda, truth and lies. To some, the brilliance
of the Web lies in its lack of hierarchy, its openness, its egalitarian design, its universality, its freedom. It is a platform for the greatest dreams
or the smallest gestures. To others, however, those same characteristics
reduce the Web to a rabble, a noisy crowd of shiny-shoed hucksters that
has overtaken the old-time county fair.' The reality is that what you see
in the Web depends less on who you are than on what you are looking for.
That is the issue at the core of this paper: helping users of the Web find
the Web that they are seeking.
As the opening sentence of this paper implies, one use of the World
Wide Web is as a source of information. If this is not already the most
important use of the Web, such a use clearly has vast potential. For
users seeking information, the Web is almost limitless in its breadth of
1. ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (stating, "[tihe Web is thus comparable,
from the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available
and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services").
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topics and number of sources. To these users, the most important quality is the ability to locate the resources which are relevant to them. Peter Morville has termed this characteristic findability,2 and information
architects have long recognized its importance. Presently, it can be very
difficult and time-consuming, in comparison to traditional information
sources such as databases or libraries, to locate appropriate information
on the Web. Even the best search engines return an enormous number
of results, leaving users to filter through hundreds of pages to determine
their relevance and authenticity. In the end, the Web's lack of findability
limits its usefulness. However, this paper argues that a regulatory system focused on improving metadata could, among other things, greatly
increase the findability of the Web.
Metadata is information about other information. It is everywhere
in modern, connected life: title and author information in library catalogues; date of creation and change tracking data in word processing documents; title, date and sender fields in e-mails; and so forth. Metadata
also helps us identify, organize, locate and assess information. On the
Web, however, metadata is under-utilized. One reason is the ubiquity of
the Web: the Web is a platform for enterprises of all types, and metadata
is not useful to all of them. More significant, though, is that the freedom
of the Web led to the abuse of metadata. Devious content creators seeking increased traffic added misleading metadata to their pages, describing every page with long lists of popular keywords. Search engines
responded by virtually ignoring metadata. Removing misleading
metadata, or cleaning the Web's metadata, would restore its usefulness
as an organizational tool, improving the accessibility of information on
the Web. Furthermore, of late there has been a renewed interest in
metadata on the Web, with emergent technologies taking advantage of
pockets of credible metadata. A regulatory system that ensures clean
metadata could be the foundation for a new generation of Web-based
tools.
While much has been written regarding the unauthorized use of
trademarks in metadata, 3 the more general, and much larger, problem of
2. Peter Morville, Ambient Findability, 4 (O'Reilly 2005) (providing three definitions
for findability: a. the quality of being locatable or navigable; b. the degree to which a particular object is easy to discover or locate; c. the degree to which a system or environment
supports navigation and retrieval).
3. See Infra pt. II (Academics seem to have seized on the area as it is one in which
existing law can be applied, mutatis mutandis, in order to solve a problem unique to the
Internet. Interestingly, however, the trademark issue is something of a storm in a teacup
because of the low impact that metadata has on search engine results. The solution of the
problem addressed in this paper - that of unclean metadata in general - would rejuvenate
the issue.); see e.g. F Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines, HTML and Trademarks: What's
the Meta For?86 Va. L. Rev. 835 (2000); Veronica Tucci, The Case of the Invisible Infringer:
Trademarks, Metatags and Initial Interest Confusion, 5 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 2 (2000);
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unclean metadata is yet to be confronted from a legal perspective. This
paper begins, in Part II, by considering the various beneficial applications which clean metadata presently has and those which it could have
in the future. Part III then considers the challenges faced in creating an
effective regulatory system to deal with unclean metadata. Part IV looks
to regulatory systems which deal with similar problems for inspiration,
examining the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. The systems
examined are representative and not exhaustive; the aim is to draw out
the key challenges faced and possible solutions. Part V incorporates the
strengths of the various approaches in order to propose a workable system, setting it out in detail, and lastly, Part VI offers ideas to deal with
potential difficulties in implementation and enforcement.
II.

THE APPLICATIONS OF CLEAN METADATA
A.

METADATA AND CLEANNESS

Metadata is information about information. 4 More technically,
metadata is "structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of information-bearing entities to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment, and management of the described entities."5 To create metadata,
characteristics such as title, author, and date of publication are collected
for information sources. These pieces of information may to some extent
be a part of the source itself (the title, for example, is arguably part of a
novel) but they also describe it. Most importantly, this information can
be used to organize a collection of sources. The use of metadata is the
difference between managing information and merely collecting it.
Clean metadatais a key concept in this paper. Metadata is only useful insofar as it accurately describes the resource to which it pertains. In
order to provide a working definition, clean metadata is metadata which
Rachael Jane Posner, Manipulative Metatagging,Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 439 (2003); Joseph T. Kucala Jr., Putting the
Meat Back in Meta-tags! 2001 J.L. Tech.& Pol'y 129 (2001).
4. Much of the academy uses the term 'meta-tags' (sometimes 'meta tags' or
metatags') to refer to metadata on the Web. Most of the Web is made up of documents
defined in HTML, a markup language which uses tags for formatting, and in HTML
metadata is defined using tags, leading to the use of that term. However, documents can be
published on the Web in any format whatsoever, and popular formats such as Adobe's PDF
and Microsoft Word's document format are indexed by modem search engines. Use of the
term 'metatags' excludes metadata in these kinds of documents, and so the more general
'metadata' is preferable.
5. Association for Library Collections and Technical Services Committee on Cataloging: Description and Access Task Force on Metadata, Summary Report, http://www.
libraries.psu.edu/tas/jca/ccda/tf-meta3.html (accessed March 16, 2006); see also Lars Marius Garshol, Metadata? Thesauri? Taxonomies? Topic maps! Making sense of it all, 30 J.
Info. Sci. 378, 379 (2004) (stating, "information about a set of data in a particular representation" or "any statement about an information resource").

534

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIV

is not false, inaccurate, or misleading. Undoubtedly, there is scope for
disagreement as to whether any particular metadata is inaccurate or
misleading; that debate is a practical one which is taken up later in the
paper.
B.

METADATA ON THE WEB

Tim Berners-Lee, recognized as the inventor of the Web, included
metadata as part of his original proposal. 6 Berners-Lee envisaged the
Web as a collection of organized, linked ideas. 7 The proposed metadata
was not only information on the identity of documents, termed 'identity
metadata,' but also on the organization of documents referred to
as'relational metadata.' It soon became clear, however, that the flexibility and simplicity of the Web was more important to its early users than
the maintenance of a strict structure. While linking caught on, due to its
usefulness as a practical tool rather than its value as metadata, the
other, explicit relational metadata did not, and identity metadata was
generally limited to titles.8
As the Web grew in popularity, the use of metadata was heavily influenced by the interaction of two innovations. First, search engines began to map the Web, introducing what is now the Web's primary
interface. 9 Second, commercial interests appeared on the Web. Search
engines, recognizing that metadata could be used to organize the Web,
began to use identity metadata such as titles and keywords in assessing
the relevance of a page to a given query. Metadata's importance skyrocketed. In response, commercial Web site operators supplied false
metadata about their pages to ensure that they appeared more frequently in search results and attracted more users. 10 As a result,
metadata became untrustworthy and effectively useless,'1 depriving the
6. Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal, http://www.w3.org
History/1989/proposal.html (accessed March 23, 2006) (explaining that, "[in practice, it is
useful for the system to be aware of the generic types of the links between items (dependences, for example), and the types of nodes (people, things, documents) without imposing
any limitations").
7. Tim Berners-Lee, Spinning the Semantic Web xiii-xiv (MIT Press 2005).
8. Tim Berners-Lee and Dan Connolly, Hypertext Markup Language 2.0, http://ftp.
ics.uci.edu/pub/ietf/html/rfcl866.txt (accessed March 16, 2006) (The first HTML standard,
HTML 2.0, included <isindex>, <link>, <title> and <meta> tags. It was issued by the World
Wide Web Consortium ('W3C') in 1996, but "roughly corresponds to the capabilities of
HTML in common use prior to June 1994.").
9. Mei Kobayashi and Koichi Takeda, Information Retrieval on the Web, ACM Computing Surveys 144, 146 (June 2000).
10. See e.g. Ira Nathenson, InternetInfoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 43, 61-66 (2000).
11. See e.g. Danny Sullivan, How to Use HTML Meta Tags, http://searchenginewatch.
com/webmasters/article.php/2167931 (accessed April 12, 2006); Jin Zhang and Alexandra
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Web of this powerful information management tool.
C.

IMPACT OF CLEAN METADATA IN THE SEARCH SPACE

Search - the selection of resources from across the Web based upon a
user's query - is now the domain of massive corporations such as Google,
Yahoo! and Microsoft. This is a testament to two things: the importance
of search to the Web; and the difficulty of searching effectively. Due to
the lack of credibility of author provided metadata, search engines use
sophisticated algorithms to produce their own metadata. One of Google's
key innovations was to use links, created primarily for human navigation, to describe the relationships between different sites, that is, as
metadata. 12 Each search engine manages an enormous repository of
metadata generated from analysis of the Web.
If the Web's metadata was clean, some of this effort could be saved.
In effect, the cost of metadata generation would be distributed amongst
individual content creators and the metadata would be shared among all
search engines. The Web would be the repository for its own metadata.
This would not be of great consequence for the current generation of
search engines, as other elements of their operation - crawling the Web,
storing the information gathered and indexing it for use - are considerably more arduous than metadata generation. However, it is potentially
important for other search applications, particularly smaller scale applications. For example, a personal search engine could be instructed to
crawl outward from a particular Web page, making an annotated map of
the results. A personal search engine could do this without having to
generate and store its own content-related metadata, decreasing the cost
in computing resources and removing the dependence on expensive development and closely guarded algorithms for generating accurate
metadata.
The latter point is the most important in terms of the cost of operation of a modern day search engine. While the physical resources needed
to run a search engine would not be substantially decreased, the barrier
to entry in terms of intellectual property would be lowered. This means
that a team of brilliant technicians and years of research and development would no longer be prerequisites to the operation of a search engine. Undoubtedly, search engines would still seek to distinguish
themselves through the analysis that they perform on the metadata, requiring both engineers and effort; however, the level of performance of
Dimitroff, Internet Search Engines'Response to Metadata Dublin Core Implementation, 30
J. Info. Sci. 310 (2004) (explaining that it appears that metadata may have some minor
influence on search engine results).
12. Google, Our Search: Google Technology, http://www.google.com/technology/ (accessed March 16, 2006).
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basic search - search without doing anything outside of the public domain - would be substantially increased.
Furthermore, there are prospects of a reduction of computational resource requirements. Guaranteed clean metadata generated by the Web
site author lends itself to a reorientation of the search engine model.
Rather than proactively analyzing the Web in order to keep a metadata
repository up to date, a search engine could rely upon submissions from
those who wish to be indexed, whether from the Web in general or
targeting particular communities of interest. 13 This removes the need to
constantly crawl the Web. While this model may not be suitable for all
search engines or applications, it does offer a potentially cheaper
alternative.
The efficiency of search engine use would also increase, mainly due
to increased accuracy of results. Most obviously, the metadata upon
which the response is based would be generated by human understanding rather than by computer analysis. Additionally, the metadata could
be structured according to standards. 14 The Dublin Core Metadata Initiative has seen the development of a standard system of metadata for
information resources. 15 Its widespread adoption would allow very accurate search on common criteria. It could also make any type of resource
accessible using search, including those such as video and audio, which
are not amenable to current search engine methods. Metadata-based
schemes for privacy and copyright information have also been
proposed.16
Given that search is so important to the Web, any development
which improves its effectiveness will produce enormous benefits. While
search engines have improved considerably, they still struggle to provide
relevant results in many cases. 17 Clean, structured metadata would
bring the accuracy of Web search closer to that of searches in a library
catalogue or database. For users, more efficient search means less time
13. The idea of community-based search engines ties in with the focus on structure,
infra pt. II (Democracy, Freedom and Choice). If academics, for instance, submit structured
information on research published on the Web, it can be searched according to various
criteria useful in that domain. Such a proposal raises the question: why can't this be done
already? The difficulty is that it is presently impossible to automatically verify the accuracy of a submission. If the submission can be checked against the metadata on the page
itself, and the metadata on the page is guaranteed to be accurate, then the submission can
very easily be verified.
14. Nathenson, supra n. 10, at 136.
15. Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, Dublin Core Metadata Element Set, Version 1.1:
Reference Description, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/ (accessed March 16, 2006)
(stating "[i]f the Internet is a library, then it is one with all the books scattered on the
floor").
16. Tim Berners-Lee, supra n. 7, at xvii.
17. See Nathenson, supra n.10, at 51-57 (discussing the so-called infoglut).
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spent searching and more relevant information obtained. The time savings alone are potentially enormous; the consequential benefits of improved information are incalculable.
D.

DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM, AND CHOICE

More fundamentally, clean metadata holds value for a democratic
society. The well-known arguments which value diversity in media ownership applies even more compellingly to the role of search engines on
the Web. Whereas we generally look to traditional media for a limited
range of information, in particular, news and current affairs, and our
concern for censorship generally extends only to the reporting of events
and the formation of public opinion, we use the Web for a far broader and
more diverse range of purposes. Controlling access to the Web means
controlling access not only to news, but to marketplaces, community forums, public records, and all manner of basic information resources.
Search is the most important interface to the Web, especially in the
discovery of new information and resources. However, large American
corporations own most of the metadata that is needed to discover new
information and resources effectively. Functionality, access, and accuracy are all subject to commercial interest. Presently, access is free and
relatively open; the process, however, is far from transparent. Google,
the current market leader, has generally defended itself based on the
objectivity of its results and its informal motto, "Don't be evil."18 However, its capitulation to China's demands for censorship has caused considerable controversy 19 and its recent partnership with AOL, a
subsidiary of media giant Time-Warner, raise difficult issues regarding
independence. 20 Google has also been subjected to lawsuits based on the
measures it takes against sites which seek to manipulate search results. 2 1 Whatever the track record of the search superpowers, the problem remains. By controlling the repositories of metadata needed in order
18. Google, Google Code of Conduct, http://investor.google.com/conduct.html (accessed
March 16, 2006).
19. See e.g. A setback for free speech in China Google's agreement to censorship sacrifices its ideals, Financial Times (London), 16 (Jan. 26, 2006); Mark Ellis and David Edwards, Goog or Evil? Fury as Google agreesto censorship in deal with Chinese leaders, The
Daily Mirror (London), 16 (Jan. 26, 2006); Lester Haines, The Register, Google pulls 'we
don't censor' statement, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/27/google-doesnt-censor/ (accessed March 16, 2006); see also Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, Berkman
Center for Internet and Society, HarvardLaw School, Documentation of Internet Filtering
Worldwide, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/ (accessed March 31, 2006) (regarding
Google's filtering in other areas).
20. See e.g. Emiliya Mychasuk and Kate Mackenzie, Speak no evil Issue of the Week:
Google Deal with AOL, Financial Times (London) (Dec. 19, 2005).
21. See e.g. Michael Liedtke, Web site files complaint against Google, Associated Press
(March 17, 2006).
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to search the Web, these companies effectively control access to the Web
itself, without any accountability or obligation to the public; worse, they
22
are bound to pursue their own financial interests.
Additionally, these corporations are subject to the control of the government of the United States. 23 The creation of an alternative source of
clean metadata would make other nations less dependent upon U.S.owned search infrastructure, increasing the stability and security of local
information economies. It would also potentially create a broader distribution of the economic benefits derived from the Web. For users, it would
ensure that guarantees of values such as privacy conformed to local standards and that records of their activities were not at the behest of a foreign government. Indeed, the European Union has proposed the
24
development of a competitor to Google for these very reasons.
Even if these power relations do not raise any concern for the reader
- perhaps the powers-that-be are presently benign enough to placate any
latent concerns - the opportunity to make search a more affordable and
accurate task is still valuable. Even if choice is not important for reasons
of avoiding undue influence from one party or protecting privacy, it is
nevertheless attractive in its own right. As consumers of search services,
we prefer the ability to choose the way in which we search. Distribution
of clean metadata and the consequent reduction in cost of the provision
of search raises the possibility of increased choice in the search
marketplace.
E.

NEW TOOLS, NEW DIMENSIONS

A new generation of metadata based tools has emerged on the Web
in recent years. 25 One promising technology is folksonomy. 26 Where pre22. See, Nathenson, supra n. 10, at 51 ("What's important - increasingly important [in
the Information Economy] - is the process by which you figure out what to look at. This is
the beginning of the real and true economics of information - not who owns the books, who
prints the books, who has the holdings. The crux today is access, not holdings. And not even
access itself but the signposts that tell you what to access - what to pay attention to. In the
Information Economy everything is plentiful - except attention."); see also Jack Goldsmith
and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? 74-76, 95-96 (Oxford University Press 2006) (discussing Google's compliance with requests to remove sites from its results and Yahoo and
MSN's filtering for the Chinese government).
23. Steven Levy, Technology: Searching for Searches; The government is demanding
millions of your queries. AOL, Yahoo and Microsoft have coughed up. Google is resisting.,
Newsweek, 34 (Jan. 30, 2006).
24. See e.g. Attack of the Eurogoogle, The Economist (March 11, 2006); Kevin O'Brien,
Europeans weigh plan for search engine; Challenge to Google may get 2 billion, International Herald Tribune, 1 (Jan. 18, 2006).
25. Examples include flickr (www.flickr.com), del.icio.us (http://del.icio.us/), and
Technorati (www.technorati.com).
26. Morville, supra n.2, 134-41.

2006]

CLEANING METADATA ON THE WEB

539,

viously only the implicit metadata value of a link was utilized (as by
Google, for instance), folksonomy allows users to add additional
metadata, called tags, to links. Folksonomy has proven to be a popular
way of annotating the Web because of its inherent flexibility. Users have
built extensions, mixing metadata and data from various sources to produce innovative tools and perspectives. 27 Another technology, known as
microformats, seeks to pave the cowpaths, and develope standards based
on popular uses of metadata. 28 With standards in place, this metadata
can then be used by a variety of applications. These new technologies
highlight the potential of clean metadata beyond general search.
Stepping into the speculative, the World Wide Web Consortium's Semantic Web proposal highlights the potential usefulness of clean
metadata and commoditized search. 29 The Semantic Web seeks to add
meaning to the Web that can be understood by machines through the use
of semantic mark-up. The most exciting visions of the Semantic Web in30
voke autonomous, intelligent agents acting as personal assistants.
These agents would be able to assist in basic tasks such as booking plane
tickets and organizing appointments by matching information available
on the Web with personal information such as a diary. While all semantic mark-up is arguably metadata, certain standard metadata would
form the infrastructure upon which the Semantic Web is built.3 1 This
core metadata would have to be clean. In addition, the availability of
commoditized search is important to the Semantic Web, as search would
be the basic means of navigation for agents gathering information.
It is impossible to explore all the various possible uses of clean
metadata. The crucial point is that once a system for guaranteeing clean
metadata has been established, it can be useful for various applications.
Search is the most obvious and immediate beneficiary, but the possible
applications are literally infinite. They are constrained only by imagination and enterprise. When a platform is established which is not preferential as to how it ought to be used, the possibilities for its exploitation
by the world's combined ingenuity are endless. This characteristic,
known as application neutrality, is what has made the Internet, and
within it the Web, so successful. Rather than constraining the evolution
27. See e.g. Programmable Web: Web 2.0 Mashup Centre, http://www.program
mableweb.com/mashups (last updated Aug. 31, 2007) (discussing such extensions, known
as mashups).
28. Microformats, About microformats,http://microformats.org/about (accessed March
19, 2006).
29. W3C Technology and Society Domain, Semantic Web, http:/Iwww.w3.org/2001/sw/
(accessed March 19, 2006).
30. Tim Berners-Lee, James Hendler & Ora Lassila, The Semantic Web, 284(5) Scientific American 34 (2001).
31. Morville, supra n. 2, at 125.

540

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIV

of technology or having to be adapted or updated to remain useful, a neutral platform allows technology to evolve freely without any fear of obsolescence. In this way, a scheme to guarantee clean metadata represents
an investment in the public infrastructure of the Web. Web users can
build whatever they please upon it, be it a shopping mall or a library,
now and in the future.
F.

REGULATION'S ROLE

The Web has a unique problem with unclean metadata. Traditional
applications of metadata involve closed systems, or systems over which
some central authority has control. The Web's open nature exposes a
lack of authority and an opportunity to profit from dishonest metadata.
The past decade has seen the rise and fall of metadata on the Web, and
no technical solution alleviating its chronic lack of credibility. Functionally, clean metadata can bring new efficiency to search, and expose the
Web as a whole to new metadata-based technologies. Making clean
metadata part of the public infrastructure of the Web accords with the
Internet's fundamental end-to-end architecture. 32 As Berners-Lee acknowledges, "if we can make of the Web something decentralized and of
great simplicity, we must be prepared to be astonished at whatever
33
might grow out of that new medium."
There has been much commentary on the perceived incompatibilities
of governmental regulation and the Internet, both popular 34 and academic. 3 5 However, just as it does offline, regulation can create authority
32. See Stefan Bechtold, ICANN Governance: Governance in Namespaces, 36 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1239, 1292-94 (2003) ([T]he [end-to-end] argument claims that as much intelligence
as possible should reside at the 'edges' of the network, that is, at applications running on
networked computers, not in the network itself. . .[bly decentralizing control, [end-to-endi
enables decentralized innovation... [and] [n]etwork architectures that violate the [end-toend] design principle tend to build 'complex function into a network [which] implicitly optimizes the network for one set of uses while substantially increasing the cost of a set of
potentially valuable uses that may be unknown or unpredictable at design time'" (footnotes
omitted)); see also, Timothy Wu, Application Centered Internet Analysis, 85 Va. L. Rev.
1163, 1192-93 (1999); Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 4 ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 2, 277 (1984) (providing the end-to-end principle).
33. Berners-Lee, supra n. 7, at xxii.
34. See e.g. John Perry Barlow, A Declarationof the Independence of Cyberspace, http://
homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html (accessed April 2, 2006); Lawrence Lessig,
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 4-5 (Basic Books 1999).
35. See e.g. David Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); Neil Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 395 (2000); Alfred Yen,
Western Frontieror Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptionsof Cyberspace, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L. J. 1207 (2002).
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and remove the incentive for abuse, to the benefit of the public. 36 Law
can be used as a tool for empowerment, an organizing force. Its intervention, rather than restricting the potential of the Internet, may in fact
allow that potential to be fully realized. 3 7 As Lawrence Lessig has
pointed out, the Internet is already governed by code; government regulation is merely a more overt form of intervention. 38 Indeed, law may be
necessary to protect the public interest against code favoring private concerns. 39 Given the scale of the possible benefits, both concrete and speculative, 40 metadata is an area ripe for regulatory intervention. The
challenge is to identify the most appropriate regulatory scheme. Part III
considers the difficulties which need to be taken into account.
III.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE REGULATION OF METADATA

The regulation of metadata involves a number of challenges. The
most significant hurdle to effective regulation is enforcement. Enforcement is made difficult by the nature of the Internet- the communication
medium upon which the Web is built 41 -and the unusual nature of the
harm sought to be regulated. Even if these considerations can be overcome, the existence of a culture of non-compliance could compromise regulatory efforts. Beyond enforcement, two considerations ought to shape
the formulation of a regulatory system. First, the ideal solution would be
in harmony with the open, end-to-end, decentralized nature of the Web.
Second, it would possess the systemic characteristic extensibility valued
42
by computer scientists.
A.

LAW AND THE INTERNET

Any discussion of law and the Internet must inevitably deal with the
36. Goldsmith and Wu, supra n. 22, at 140-42; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 505-06 (1999).
37. Thomas Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to
Preserve the Internet's Unregulated Character,80 Minn. L. Rev. 215, 215-18 (2000); Goldsmith and Wu, supra n. 22, at 44-45.
38. See generally Lessig, supra n. 34.
39. R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 457, 508 (2005).
40. Nachbar, supra n. 37, at 218 (recognizing that "the structure we use for arranging
[the Web's] content may have a greater impact on society than the underlying content
itself").
41. See Internet.com, Internt, http://webopedia.internt.com/TERMIinternt.html (last
accessed Oct. 15, 2007) (The name 'Internet' comes from the fact that it is a network of
networks. The Internet supports the transmission of data from any point to any other via a
number of different paths based on the Internet Protocol. The Web is a particular use of
that capacity - an application - governed by a set of communication and document format
standards (HTTP and HTML, amongst others).).
42. See infra, pt. III, (discussing Maintainingthe Tao of the Web).
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issue of jurisdiction. 4 3 The problem, in short, is that the Internet is
global while municipal legal systems are not. The Internet crosses geographical boundaries indiscriminately, meaning that creators and recipients of content can be in different jurisdictions. 44 This limits the
effectiveness of regulation, leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of
trying to do so, 4 5 because a government has no capacity to enforce its law
in foreign jurisdictions. Hence, content providers in other jurisdictions
cannot be controlled, and providers in the regulating jurisdiction can
simply relocate their content without prejudice.
Others have proposed ideal solutions to the conundrum of jurisdiction. 46 This paper seeks a pragmatic and immediate way in which legislation can be made enforceable, and hence, effective. A regulatory
scheme must either establish a means of enforcement against persons in
other jurisdictions, or circumscribe its ambit to the area in which it can
already ensure that its legislation will be enforced. The former approach
has proven ineffective in the past when, even when some degree of international consensus has been reached in order to enable a global response
to particular issues, the results have been underwhelming. 4 7 Concerted
international action is rare, and the usual outcome is compliance in a
small number of countries with a significant interest undone by safe
havens outside of those jurisdictions. 48 The latter approach, limiting the
regulation to one's own jurisdiction, can be difficult to achieve without
compromising the aims of the regulation. For instance, a United States
law on clean metadata limited to hosts in the United States would - on
its own - do little to alleviate the problem.
Furthermore, the architecture of the Internet places constraints on
the legal options which might otherwise be available, and those constraints must be taken into account. Identifying and locating those who
43. Michael Geist, Internet Law in Canada,41 (Captus Press 2000); Stuart Biegel, Beyond Our Control? Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace
112-14 (MIT Press 2003).
44. Johnson and Post, supra n. 35, at 1368-76.
45. See Johnson & Post, supra n. 35, at 1369-70; Biegel, supra n. 43, at 111; Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1239-44 (1998).
46. Johnson & Post, supra n. 35 (The authors famously advocated 'taking cyberspace
seriously," whereby national governments would relinquish sovereignty over certain areas
to organic, Internet-developed authorities. While it is certainly arguable on the merits that
Internet-based governance of the Internet is the best solution, such a proposal provides
very little practical guidance as to how effective regulation can be produced.).
47. Miriam Miquelon-Weismann, The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized Implementation of InternationalPenal Law: What Prospects For ProceduralDue Process?, 23
John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 329, 351-61 (2005); Goldsmith & Wu, supra n. 22, at
65-67.
48. The majority of these countries do not actively seek to become safe havens, they are
simply used that way because of a lack of motivation and/or capacity to police the behavior
in question.
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are not complying with a regulatory scheme can be difficult due to the
open architecture of the Internet. 4 9 This makes enforcement problem50
atic, even within a sophisticated jurisdiction such as the United States.
In jurisdictions with less legal and technological infrastructure and resources, it can render enforcement impossible.
B.

TRADITIONAL METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT

Civil actions are brought by individual citizens. While the problem of
jurisdiction may be less severe for civil action than criminal prosecution,
the problems of identification and enforcement of judgments present an
even greater hurdle to private parties. Moreover, the diffuse nature of
the harm in question makes civil remedies in general unattractive as no
single party has sufficient individual interest to pursue them. The harm
suffered by any individual user is small, yet there is a very significant
cumulative harm to a large group of people. While representative actions
such as class actions exist to address this very problem, in the case of
unclean metadata, the source of harm is also diffuse. Representative actions are therefore unworkable. The only solution is to leave enforcement
to a central party, such as the government. If the key difference between
government-imposed sanctions and civil actions is that civil actions are
brought by individuals, the problem of diffuse harm seems to render
them irremediable and unsuitable for the problem at hand.
The traditional form of government sanction is the criminal penalty,
enforced through the criminal justice system. Governments also impose
civil penalties, enforced without the cost and rigor of the criminal justice
system. Occasionally, where they can be effective, governments impose
in-kind penalties. Where regulation has granted some special status or
right, that right may be taken away for failure to obey the conditions
attached to it. Examples include the de-registration of doctors and the
suspension of drivers' licenses. These latter types of penalties are generally either reinforced by criminal penalties in the case of persistent infringement or layered together in a regulatory system, with the
particular penalty imposed depending on the seriousness of the breach in
question. Government imposed penalties are sensitive to the architectural difficulties of jurisdiction and anonymity identified above. However, they deal well with the problem of diffuse harm, as the government
acts in the public interest to prevent the harm and the government is
less sensitive to the issue of cost.
49. Biegel, supra n. 43, at 112-13.
50. United States Department of Justice, The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of
Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet. A Report of the President'sWorking
Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime
unlawful.htm (Mar. 2000).
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Government imposed sanctions appear to be the only option, and significant issues need to be resolved in order for them to be effective. However, even if the problems identified above can be overcome, the
existence of a culture of non-compliance would be fatal to regulatory
efforts.
C.

CULTURES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

51
If enough people choose to disobey the law, it ceases to have effect.
Where a general inclination to disobey the law, or a particular law, is
present, it might be said that a culture of non-compliance exists. The
running battle between consumers and record labels has highlighted the
problem of enforcing a legal regime against a culture of non-compliance. 5 2 Despite the clarity and universality of intellectual property laws,
the music industry is struggling to protect its copyrights. The issue is a
complex one; what is clear, however, is that there is significant intellectual and public opposition to the idea that the copying of music over the
Internet ought to be proscribed, at least in light of the music industrysanctioned alternatives. 53 Copyright exists for the public benefit, sacrificing the liberty to deal with certain materials in certain ways in order
to encourage creativity and innovation, yet the public remains unconvinced that the balance that has been struck is, in light of the Internet,
the correct one. The result has been widespread disobedience, 54 compromising the effectiveness of the legislation. The establishment of a culture
of non-compliance is made more likely on the Internet by the problems of
jurisdiction and anonymity discussed above.
Regulation prohibiting unclean metadata is vulnerable to the same
problem. As is the case with the music industry's attempt to prosecute
copyright violation, the regulation of metadata would seek to stop an activity that is widespread and tolerated. Worse, the publishing of unclean
metadata is not illegal offline, nor is it analogous to an activity which is
illegal offline, unlike breach of copyright law. 5 5 Unclean metadata is a

51. Biegel, supra n. 43, at 101-07 (considering prohibition, marijuana and race riots as
examples).
52. Geist, supra n. 43, at 517-583; Biegel, supra n. 43, at xvii-xix, 73-76, 279-91; Goldsmith and Wu, supra n. 22, at 105-25.
53. See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law
toLock Down Culture and Control Creativity (Penguin Press 2004) (discussing intellectual
objections to the present state of copyright law); Timothy Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 Va.
L. Rev. 679, 685, 722-6 (2003) (regarding the public); John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy ofIdeas, Wired Magazine, 8.10 (Oct. 2000) (available at http://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/8. 10/download.html).
54. Biegel, supra n. 43, at xi-xii, 116-17.
55. It is, however, generally seen to be a dishonest practice. In some limited circumstances the use of false or misleading metadata might be compared to false or misleading
advertising, but the relationship between the offence and the profit is much less direct.
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problem, through lack of information, to which the general public might
well be apathetic. Furthermore, based on libertarian ideals, some activists oppose any regulation, especially regulation which touches upon content. Authoring content on the Web is an area in which an enormous
number of people are involved, making non-compliance among only a
sub-section of those it seeks to control potentially overwhelming. Any
regulation must, therefore, pay careful regard to the balance which it
strikes between the public benefit produced by the creation of a system of
clean metadata and the cost imposed upon individual authors.
D.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Regulating metadata engages the sensitive subject of freedom of
speech. While it is not possible to address the specific requirements of
each jurisdiction, a few salient points can be made. Jurisprudence on
freedom of speech generally involves some question of reasonableness, of
proportionality between the harm sought to be avoided, and the measure
introduced to avoid it. 56 A measure would require disclosure of identification, assessment of metadata by a third party, or limited publication to
certain types of persons might well be considered disproportionate, especially in light of the Web's present near-absolute freedom and the
breadth of purposes which it incorporates. The key is to ensure not just
that the benefits of the scheme outweigh the costs imposed, but to ensure
that the scheme is the least restrictive alternative which produces those
benefits.

E.

MAINTAINING THE TAO OF THE WEB

In advocating the use of regulation to ensure clean metadata on the
Web, the value of democratized, commoditized search and the potential
57
Alfor innovation built upon an end-to-end architecture are stressed.
though replacing one bottleneck or centralizing influence with another
may have some net benefit, it fails to realize important benefits associated with decentralization.5 8 Hence, it is highly desirable that metadata
is regulated in accordance with these ideas in order to procure the maximum advantage from clean metadata. This is a difficult goal, because
government regulation has a centralizing effect; 59 decentralized regulation is almost an oxymoron. Nevertheless, centralization can be used as a
comparative criterion. A system that requires the vetting of all Web
56. See e.g. Ashcroft v ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002); Lange v Austrl. Broad. Corp.
(1997) 189 CLR 520, 567 (in Australia).
57. See supra, pt. II, Regulations Role; see also Nachbar, supra n. 37, at 51-59.
58. See supra, pt. I, Impact of Clean Metadata in the Search Space (discussing how
replacing private authority with public authority may be worthwhile on the whole).
59. Bechtold, supra n. 32, at 1317.
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pages by a single, central authority is less attractive, in terms of this
criterion, than one which allows vetting by a number of different
authorities.
Furthermore, computer science values a systemic characteristic
known as extensibility. Extensibility is the facility with which a system
can be extended to allow new uses without affecting the original functionality. 60 This is relevant in two respects. First, the regulatory system
introduced ought not to limit the existing functionality of the Web, or the
Internet, for that matter. Second, the system which is introduced should
itself be extensible, such that it can be used as a platform for other innovations should the need arise. Extensibility is also comparative, with the
status quo as a benchmark. While identifying the least restrictive regulatory scheme is not difficult once schemes have been proposed, extensibility in the second sense may rest upon the details of implementation,
making assessment across high-level models difficult.
Clearly, there are a number of significant difficulties which need to
be overcome. The nature of the Internet and the problem at hand favor
government imposed sanction over private action, but also pose significant impediments to effective enforcement. Furthermore, any regulation
would need to be framed in such a way as to avoid falling victim to a
culture of non-compliance. If these considerations can be accounted for
and options remain, decentralization and extensibility are relevant criteria for assessing which alternative is the most attractive. Part IV looks
at models found in other areas of law for inspiration in addressing these
challenges.
IV. WORKING MODELS FOR THE REGULATION OF METADATA
As the adage counsels, nothing teaches better than experience. As
such, existing regulatory schemes are a logical place to look in considering how regulation can produce clean metadata on the Web. However,
before doing so it is useful to consider some more fundamental ideas regarding regulation of the Internet. The question of how law should deal
with the Internet has been a source of considerable difficulty for legal
scholars, and the melding of a number of different perspectives exhorts
both caution and creativity. With this in mind, the current approaches to
regulating spam and cybersquatting are considered. A number of points
emerge, most importantly the effectiveness and the limits of in-kind regulation based on the domain name system.
60. Oxford English Dictionary vol. 5, 596 (James A.H. Murray et al. eds., 2d ed.,
Carendon Press 1989) (A system design principle that takes into consideration future
growth.).
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A.

REGULATION AND THE INTERNET

The derisory comparison of the study of'the law of cyberspace' to 'the
law of the horse' appears to suggest that the Internet can be understood,
and ought to be approached, entirely within the foundations provided by
existing doctrines of law. 6 1 Clearly, there is merit in the extension of
known principles to new circumstances - centuries of compounded wisdom can illuminate seemingly unprecedented controversies with surprising clarity. As Benjamin Cardozo noted, "[wie fancy ourselves to be
dealing with some ultramodern controversy, the product of the clash of
interests in an industrial society. The problem is laid bare, and at its
62
core are the ancient mysteries crying out for understanding."
However, while Easterbrook certainly makes a point about the usefulness of general principles, he does not deny the novelty of the Internet. Instead, he points out two threats to the credibility of legal
scholarship focused on the Internet's novelty. The first is the "risk of
multidisciplinary dilettantism," where legal analysis based on an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of the technology involved leads to
"the worst of both worlds."6 3 The second, Easterbrook's "principal conclusion," is a warning against applying doctrines to cyberspace which are
not fully understood in their present context. 64 Easterbrook asks, regarding intellectual property, "[i]f we are so far behind in matching law
to a well-understood technology such as photocopiers... what chance do
we have for a technology such as computers?" 65 If we cannot explain the
functioning of a doctrine in the familiar, offline world, then we have no
basis on which to judge how it ought to be modified in order to best regulate cyberspace.
At the root of these arguments lies a significant supposition. If a
deep knowledge of the technology and a thorough understanding of the
rationales informing the doctrines are necessary, then it must be because
some decision needs to be made which is best made in an informed manner. Implicit in Easterbrook's criticism is a belief that the application of
existing legal principles to the Internet must be on a thoughtful, reasoned basis. That is, while recognizing the importance of an approach to
law based on general principles, Easterbrook recognizes that the new environment of the Internet mandates an active consideration of their underlying justifications. This is not, therefore, merely another set of facts
61. See Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F.
207 (2006); Lessig, supra n. 36 at 501-02 (discussing the same perspective).
62. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (Columbia Univ. Press
1928).
63. Easterbrook, supra n. 61, at 207.
64. Id. at 208-209.
65. Id. at 210.
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more is needed. The Inin light of its own special
that balance should be
steps. 66

In this sense, then, there really is a cyberspace. It is not a jurisdiction disjoint from the familiar one, in which we have to recreate law as
we know it. It is a new place in the sense that we are dealing with Car67
dozo's "ancient mysteries" in a fresh context.
This is not to say that some, even the majority, of existing principles
will not be applicable, becasue existing law provides an essential foundation for much of what is already possible on the Internet. 68 However, as
Lessig stresses in considering constitutional dilemmas caused by new
technology, existing doctrines must be actively translated to the Internet, when the principles which inform them are relevant. 69 Wagner
highlights one novel consideration, stating that "it is not quite as simple
as property rules versus liability rules; the recognition of the participation of software regulation demands a more nuanced approach." 70 Furthermore, this process must be richer than a simple online versus offline
dichotomy might suggest. The Internet supports a diverse range of applications, each with different architectures, and so in each case the regulatory balance requires distinct consideration. 7 1 A deep and accurate
appreciation of the technology involved is necessary to avoid, appropriating Easterbrook's equine theme, making an ass of oneself.
While existing legal structures are a logical place to start in searching for a regulatory solution to the problem of unclean metadata, the
assumptions which underlie them need to be carefully considered before
they can be translated to the Web. What is being sought in considering
existing regulatory models is not necessarily a working example which
can be applied to solve the problem, or a place in the existing legal structure into which a remedy can be slotted - although either would obviously be welcome discoveries. Instead, the solution can be written on a
blank page; anything is possible. The regulatory models which are considered below are considered as inspirations, a kind of collective experience of Internet regulation. All raise salient points and illuminate
elements of a potential solution.
66. Id.
67. Chris Reed, Internet Law Text and Materials 307 (Cambridge University Press
2004); Goldsmith, supra n. 45, at 1201, 1250.
68. Goldsmith & Wu, supra n. 22, at 140-42; Easterbrook, supra n. 61, at 210.
69. Lessig, supra n. 34, at 111-21.
70. Wagner, supra n. 39, at 510.
71. Wu, supra n. 32, at 1163-65.
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B.

E-MAIL SPAM AND CAN-SPAM

The word 'spam' is generally used to describe unsolicited electronic
messages distributed in bulk. E-mail spam is a significant problem on
the Internet. Estimates of its cost -productivity lost in dealing with unwanted e-mails, infrastructure costs incurred in moving, storing and
managing a greater volume of e-mail, and countermeasures used to reduce its impact - are staggering. The consensus is that spam costs at
least $10 billion per year. 7 2 That is without considering questions of privacy, annoyance or the variety of malicious purposes for which it is used,
such as fraud and identity theft. E-mail employs a very open architecture that lacks strict authentication mechanisms, 73 and make the bulk
sending of e-mail very difficult to prevent.
E-mail spam shares much in common with the problem of unclean
metadata. It is an abuse of a network, imposing costs upon the public for
private benefit.
Indeed, the use of unclean metadata has been called
"spamdexing." 74 The harm is similarly diffuse. The same private benefit
and self-promotion is involved, and the regulation of spam presents similar, though more direct, concerns regarding freedom of speech, jurisdiction, and anonymity.
Presently, spam differs from unclean metadata in that each spammer (a person who sends spam) is individually responsible for a significant amount of harm. By contrast, at present each publisher of unclean
metadata is only responsible for a small amount of harm, as the greater
part of the harm is caused by the general inutility of metadata due to
widespread abuse. However, if metadata were generally clean, and
72. Dominic-Chantale Alepin, Opting-Out: A Technical, Legal and PracticalLook at
the CAN-Spam Act of 2003, 28 Colum. J. L. & Arts 41, 42 (2004) ($9.4 billion world-wide);
Erin Elizabeth Marks, Spammers Clog In-boxes Everywhere: Will the CAN-Spam Act of
2003 Halt the Invasion? 54 Case W. Res. 943, 944 (2004) ($20.5 billion world-wide); Reagan
Smith, Eliminating the Spam From Your Internet Diet: the Possible Effects of the Unsolicited CommercialElectronicMail Act of2001 on Junk E-Mail, 35 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 411, 412
(2003) ($10 billion in the U.S.); Richard Warner, Spam and Beyond: Freedom, Efficiency,
and the Regulation of E-Mail Advertising, 22 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 141,
141 (2003) ($20 billion world-wide); Adam Mossoff, Spam - Oy, What a Nuisance! 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 625, 628 (2004) (up to $198 billion by 2007); Elizabeth Alongi, Has the US
Canned Spam? 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 263 (2004) ($11.9 billion in the U.S. and Europe in
2002); Jordan Blanke, Canned Spam: New State and FederalLegislation Attempts to Put a
Lid On It, 7 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech. J. 305, 305 (2004) ($10 to $87 billion in the U.S. in
2003).
73. Warner, supra n. 72, at 147-48; Fed. Trade Commn., NationalDo Not Email Registry A Report to Congress, 3-12, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf (accessed
April 9, 2006) (informing Congress that the FTC will not set up a "do not e-mail" registry,
despite being empowered to do so by CAN-SPAM, because such a registry would be ineffective or even counter-productive).
74. Nathenson, supra n. 10.
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therefore trusted, one person might individually inflict a significant
amount of harm by publishing unclean metadata.
In 2003 Congress enacted the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornographyand Marketing Act ("CAN-SPAM"), 75 and on January
1, 2004 it came into effect at the expense of a number of states' legislative schemes. 76 CAN-SPAM's substantive provisions, particularly its use
of an opt-out rather than opt-in scheme, have been criticized as legitimizing rather than preventing spam. 77 Unfortunately, it is hard to separate
the difficulties caused by the Act's substantive provisions from the
problems of enforcement. Nevertheless, CAN-SPAM is instructive in
three ways.
First, CAN-SPAM relies upon traditional enforcement mechanisms.
It makes certain spam-related behavior criminal, which includes sending
e-mails with falsified header information and harvesting e-mail addresses, 78 and subjects others to considerable civil penalties based on either actual loss or statutory damages. 7 9 CAN-SPAM removes the rights
of individuals to bring civil actions against spammers, instead granting
powers of enforcement to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), State
Attorney Generals, and Internet Service Providers.8 0 Clearly, legislators
felt that making a civil action available to the general public would be
inappropriate, and instead granted enforcement authority to particular
persons on behalf of the public at large. The designation of public persons such as State Attorney Generals and the FTC allows the exercise of
appropriate discretion in the enforcement of the legislation, mitigating
any unintended side effects which the legislation might have on its face.
The FTC claims that CAN-SPAM has helped reduce the amount of spam
sent,8 1 and there have been over fifty actions brought under the
75. Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699-2719 (2003).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 7707 (2006).
77. See Alongi, supra n. 72, at 287-88 (Critics have suggested that the word 'can' in the
act's title should be read as 'to be able to' rather than 'to throw in the trash.').
78. 15 U.S.C § 7704 (2006).
79. 15 U.S.C § 7706 (f)-(g) (2006).
80. 15 U.S.C § 7706 (2006); see 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (b) (2006) (Other federal agencies and
parties, such as banks, can take action against particular types of spammers, such as those
undertaking phishing or other fraudulent activities.).
81. Fed. Trade Commn., Effectiveness and Enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act: A Report to Congress, 7-8, 23, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspamO5/O51220canspamrpt.pdf (accessed April 9, 2006) (However, the FTC's report casts a decrease in the percentage of email which is spam as a sign that progress is being made, despite the report's own source
indicating that the actual volume of spam has increased.); MX Logic, MX Logic Reports
Spam Accounts for 67 Percent of All Email in 2005, 9-13, http://www.mxlogic.com/
news-events/press releases/09_22_05_SpamStats.html (accessed April 9, 2006) (The progress is made is more accurately described as a slowing of the growth of spam to below the
rate of the growth of legitimate e-mail. Also, the report acknowledges that much of the
progress is attributable to other factors such as advances in anti-spam technology.); see
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scheme.8 2
However, while the prosecutions evince some limited success within
the United States, CAN-SPAM demonstrates the difficulties involved in
using national legislation to address a global problem.8 3 The amount of
spam sent to Internet users has in fact increased since CAN-SPAM came
into effect.8 4 Those involved in the sending of spain recognize the importance of jurisdictional impediments to prosecution.8 5 Recognizing the
limits of existing means of international enforcement, the FTC proposed
and Congress passed the US SAFE WEB Act to extend its own capacity
to cooperate with other agencies and pursue offenders overseas.8 6 The
lack of significant progress, despite considerable International Telecommunication Union and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development attention to the problem, highlights the difficulty of achieving
concerted and effective international action. 8 7 At this point, CANSPAM's history does not bode well for the capacity to eliminate metadata
through regulation enforced through these traditional avenues.
Second, CAN-SPAM demonstrates that technical problems of this
nature are potentially of sufficient political significance to compel legislation. Laypersons understand the problem of spain, whether by analogy
from other forms of direct marketing or through experience; the problem
also Anne Broache, FTC says federal spam law has worked, http://news.com.com/
FTC+says+Federal+spam+law+has+worked/2100-1028_3-6003071.html (April 9, 2006).
82. Fed. Trade Commn, supra n. 81, at ii.
83. ' Id. at 25 (stating '[tihese obstacles are formidable, and in some instances,
insurmountable").
84. MX Logic, supra n. 81.
85. See e.g. hostbp.com, Overseas Bulletproof Web Hosting, http://hostbp.com/Bullet
Proof.htm (accessed April 9, 2006) ("Another reason we do this [allow the sending of spare]
is that we put your [Web site] in our overseas servers where the local law will protect your
[Web sites] should not be shut down by any reason (sic). No illegal content is accepted in
our servers."). This Web site may, due to its nature, no longer be available. A copy is on file
with the author. A search for terms such as 'bulletproof hosting' should reveal similar Web
sites.
86. Pub. L. No. 109-455, 120 Stat. 3372 (2006) (The UndertakingSpam, Spyware, and
Fraud Enforcement with Enforcers beyond Borders Act of 2005,introduced by Senator
Gordon H Smith, OR); Fed. Trade Commn., The US SAFE WEB Act: Protecting Consumers
from Spam, Spyware, and Fraud, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ussafeweb/fUSSAFEWEB.pdf
(accessed April 9, 2006) (The Act is intended "to address the challenges posed by globalization of fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair practices" by, among other things, improving its
capacity for cooperation with its foreign counterparts and strengthening its participation in
international projects.). On Oct. 10, 2007 the FTC announced the first law enforcement
action brought using the US SAFE WEB Act and by sharing information with foreign
partners.
87. International Telecommunication Union, ITU Activities on Countering Spam,
http://www.itu.intlosg/spu/spam/ (accessed April 27, 2006); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Work on Spam, http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en2649_22555297_1_1_1_1_37441,00.html (accessed April 27, 2006).
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of unclean metadata should be similarly comprehensible. 88 Furthermore,
CAN-SPAM demonstrates that the U.S. Congress is prepared to intervene on the Internet in the public interest, and not simply defer to the
balance established by the technological efforts of either side. It supports
the understanding that although regulation of Internet-related behavior
can be troublesome, "regulation need not be perfect to be effective - that
89
regulation works through transaction cost rather than hermetic seal."
Finally, CAN-SPAM prohibits the use of deceptive subject headings.
A subject heading is misleading if, based on an objective test, it would
mislead the recipient. 90 This is useful because it introduces a precedent
- tested in at least eight cases 9 ' - with regard to freedom of speech concerns. It also highlights the unacceptability of deceptive online marketing practices. It is only a small step from prohibiting the use of deceptive
subject headings in e-mail to prohibiting the use of deceptive metadata
on the Web.
C.

CYBERSQUATTING AND THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Cybersquatting has been defined as "the deliberate, bad-faith, and
abusive registration of Internet domain names in violation of the rights
of trademark owners."9 2 The initial response to cybersquatting was to
bring actions under the rubric of trademark protection: direct trademark
infringement, unfair competition, dilution, contributory infringement,
and vicarious liability. 93 However, these actions were not overly successful as important elements required to establish liability were not present
in cases of cybersquatting. 9 4 In addition, the problems raised by jurisdiction, such as comity and enforcement ofjudgments, compromised actions
which might otherwise have been successful. 95
The response of the United States' Congress was to enact legislation
adapting trademark actions to make them more effective against cybersquatting. That legislation is the Anti-CybersquattingConsumer Protec88. The problem of unclean metadata was summarized aptly by a colleague with the
question: "You know how when you search for anything on the Internet (sic) you get porn?"
The comprehension is intuitive; the challenge is in convincing people that the problem is
not "just the way the Web is" but rather is a result of misbehavior, and is potentially remediable through legislation.
89. Wu, supra n. 32, at 1195.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (a)(2).
91. Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra n. 81, at A-10.
92. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting Rights and
Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 301, 307 (2005).
93. Id. at 311.
94. Id. at 311-15; Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root 115 (MIT Press 2002).
95. Holland, supra n. 92, at 315-16.
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tion Act ("ACPA"), 96 enacted in 1999. In addition to tailoring the
substantive requirements of trademark infringement actions to cybersquatting, the ACPA also addresses the problem of jurisdiction. An action in rem is allowed where personal jurisdiction over the owner of the
domain cannot be established. In that case, the remedies available,
which normally include statutory damages as well as traditional trademark remedies of damages and injunctions, are limited to an order for
the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name. 9 7 This in-kind remedy
provides very effective relief for plaintiffs, as its execution takes little
more than a few keystrokes, but it relies on U.S. control of a significant
part of the domain name system.
The domain name system ("DNS") is a look-up mechanism which
translates memorable names such as 'walmart.com' to Internet protocal
("IP") addresses. IP addresses are numeric addresses used to identify
computers on the Internet. 98 Ultimate responsibility for the domain
name system rests with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), a private non-profit company. 99 The U.S. government exercises de jure control over ICANN. In addition to ICANN
being a California corporation, ICANN's authority comes from a memorandum of understanding between itself and the U.S. government.' 0 0
This relationship has been the source of considerable international con10 2
troversy10 1 and academic commentary.
As the U.S. government is capable of regulating ICANN, it can address the issue of cybersquatting in domains under the control of ICANN
through direct intervention by directing that orders made under the
ACPA be enforced, in other words, that ICANN carry out the cancellation or forfeiture of the domain names in question. However, not all do96. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(I) (2006).
98. ICANN, What is the Domain Name System? http://www.icann.org/faq/#dns (accessed April 7, 2006).
99. A Michael Froomkin and Mark Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 2
(2003); Holland, supra n. 92, at 306; ICANN, What is ICANN? http://www.icann.org/faq/
#WhatisICANN (accessed April 7, 2006).
100. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Memorandum of
UnderstandingBetween the Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporationfor Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
icann.htm (accessed April 7, 2006).
101. Editorial, Internet Control, Business Standard, 11 (Nov. 18, 2005); Andy Sullivan,
Digital divide a focus at close of Net summit, Reuters News (Nov. 19, 2005); Matt Moore,
Tech summit ends with Internet control in question despite agreement, Associated Press
Newswires (Nov. 19, 2005); Goldsmith & Wu, supra n. 22, at 169-71; Mueller, supra n. 94,
at 223.
102. See generally, Mueller, supra n. 94; Froomkin & Lemley, supra n. 99; John Palfrey,
The End of the Experiment: How ICANN's Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed,
17(2) Harv. J. L. & Tech. 409, 410-11 (2004).
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mains are under the direct control of ICANN. Domains come in two
types: global domains such as .com, .net and .org (known as generic top
level domains or gTLDs); and country-specific domains such as .com.au,
.co.uk and .org.nz (known as country code top level domains or ccTLDs).
While control of the former still rests with ICANN, control of the latter
has been ceded to local authorities in each country.
While ICANN has a legitimate role in ensuring compliance with
technical standards, these local authorities would resist attempts to
force compliance with U.S. law.' 0 3 Technically, ICANN could withdraw
the delegation of power to a country's authority, 10 4 but that is not a politically viable option - it would result in the breakdown of the entire do10 5
main name system and compromise the operation of the Internet.
The importance of gTLDs means that the orders available under the
ACPA are potentially effective remedies. An action by a U.S. company
against a cybersquatter, whether the cybersquatter is subject to U.S. jurisdiction or not, is most likely to involve a gTLD because these domains
are both the most common' 0 6 and the most commonly used by U.S. companies. However, the orders provided for by the ACPA are of no effect
against cybersquatters holding ccTLDs outside the United States. Moreover, the U.S. is unique in its ability to regulate gTLDs. No other country
has that privilege; if the same legislation was enacted in another jurisdiction it would cover only that country's own ccTLDs.
Clearly, in-kind penalties can provide a very effective and easily enforceable remedy where jurisdiction would otherwise make enforcement
103. Andrew Orlowski, Country code chiefs, registrarsmull ICANN breakaway, http:l
www.theregister.co.uk/2000/11/25/country-code chiefsregistrars-mull_2 (accessed April
25, 2006); Laurence Helfer and Graeme Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: the
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 141,
238 (2001); Mueller, supra n. 94, at 7-8.
104. This could be done very easily, by amending the root domain name server to indicate that a server other than the one currently in use is responsible for domain names
which contain that country code.
105. See Joseph Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination:A Domain
Name Case Study, 74 Ind. L.J. 587, 593 (1999). U.S. control over the domain name system
is accepted internationally because its administration has so far been both unintrusive and
effective. Attempting to use the domain name system as a means to enforce its laws in
other jurisdictions would be seen as a flagrant abuse, and would likely lead to the establishment of an international organization running a separate root domain name server.
This would effectively create two different Internets on the same infrastructure. The
universality of the present domain name system is not based on law - it is largely
voluntary.
106. Caslon Analytics, Note on gTLD and 2LD sizes, http://www.caslon.com.au/dnssizes
note.htm (accessed April 25, 2006) (As of January 2003 the .corn gTLD was almost 4 times
the size of the largest ccTLD(.de), and the .net, .org, info and .biz domains were each larger
than almost all ccTLDs.).
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difficult.107 However, it is important to note that as a centralized rather
than decentralized system, DNS is an anomaly on the Internet. Other
problems, such as spam cannot be addressed via DNS as it does not have
the same centralizing effect in all contexts. In addition, DNS is only effectively centralized with respect to gTLDs; indeed, for countries other
than the U.S., DNS is centralized only with regard to each country's
ccTLDs, and gTLDs are not regulable at all.10 8 Two lessons, then, should
be learned from the ACPA. First, where traditional alternatives are ineffective due to the nature of the Internet, in-kind remedies can be a very
effective form of relief. Second, DNS, as a centralized point in the architecture of the Internet, can, with some limitations, be used as a way for
national governments to regulate the Internet. 10 9
D.

CYBERSQUATTING AND THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME

DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY

An alternative approach to cybersquatting is encapsulated in
ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
("UDRP"). 110 ICANN has required all registrars to agree to abide by the
UDRP since its adoption in 1999. It allows trademark holders to bring an
administrative action before an approved dispute resolution service provider where they allege that an identical or confusingly similar domain
name was registered and is being used in bad faith, without the holder
having any rights or legitimate interests in the name. x l1 Remedies avail112
able are limited to cancellation and forfeiture of the domain.
The UDRP has been heavily criticized for perceived procedural biases against defendants and the inconsistency of decisions with the policy itself.1 13 In its defense, the UDRP can be seen as nothing more than
an extension of the decision making process to include the complaints of
interested parties; what ICANN giveth, ICANN taketh away. Furthermore, the rights of both parties to resort to court proceedings are explic107. Goldsmith & Wu, supra n. 22, at 77-79.
108. Mueller, supra n. 94, 225. Cf. Goldsmith and Wu, supra n. 22, at 168-71 (stating
that '[t]here is, however, a "global law" without which there would be no Internet: the domain name system (DNS).'); Biegel, supra n. 43, at 197 (quoting David Post, "(control over
the operation of the root server] is quite literally a kind of life-or-death power over the
global network itself').
109. Mueller, supra n. 94, at 205-08, 219, 221.
110. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp.htm (accessed April 9, 2006) [hereinafter UDRP].
111. Id. at Article 4(a).
112. Id. at Article 4(i).
113. See e.g. Miguel Danielson, Confusion, Illusion and the Death of TrademarkLaw in
Domain Name Disputes, 6 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 3 (2001); Michael Geist, Fair.com?:AnExamination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 Brook. J. Int'l L.
903, 935-6 (2002); Mueller, supra n. 94, at 193.
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itly preserved by the UDRP. 114 Just or not, however, it has been a very
significant piece of regulation. ICANN's statistics show that by 2004
there had been almost ten thousand cases involving over fifteen thousand domains, with over two-thirds resulting in cancellations or transfers. 1 15 The timetable for dispute settlement allows a maximum of 42
days from commencement of proceedings for a decision to be made. 116 In
remany cases, especially those involving known cybersquatters, the 117
spondent fails to submit a response, further shortening the process.
Like the ACPA, the UDRP utilizes DNS for rapid, effective enforcement. However, the UDRP is not based upon legislation. It is enforced
contractually: all registrars providing gTLDs are compelled to apply and
enforce it, and all domain name registrants are required to agree to its
terms. It is most certainly regulation, in the broad sense in which that
term is used here, but it does not come from the usual source (government) 118 and it is a creature of contract rather than legislation. Some
concern is justifiable here, as ICANN is seemingly in a position to demand whatever it pleases from domain name owners. Indeed, that is the
danger of failure to act legislatively: private authorities or parties with
vested interests may take the initiative to establish schemes, in contract
or in code, which favor their interests. That concern is mitigated by the
oversight of the U.S. government, and the less direct but nonetheless
considerable pressure of international scrutiny.

E.

PROPOSING REGULATION

Looking to existing regulatory schemes for inspiration, some diverse
approaches to problems with similar features to the one at hand provide
instruction as to how the regulation of unclean metadata might be undertaken. Spam illustrates the weakness of the conventional enforce114. UDRP, supra n. 110, at Article 4(k). In any case, it is highly doubtful that ICANN
could have taken away the right of a complainant, a non-party to the contract between the
registrar and the respondent, to initiate proceedings based on trademark or under the
ACPA. It may, however, have been able to require complainants using the UDRP to waive
their rights to bring actions in other forums.
115. ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Dispute-Resolution
Policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (accessed April 9, 2006).
116. ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.
icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (accessed April 9, 2006) (Article 5(a) allows 20 days
for the submission of a response, article 6(b) allows 5 days for an appointment of a panel,
article 15(b) allows 14 days for a decision, and article 16(a) allows 3 days for communication of the decision to the parties.).
117. Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark
Disputes Under ICANN's UDRP, 14-17, http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/markle-report-final.pdf
(accessed April 9, 2006).
118. Although the UDRP could be said to have the tacit support of the U.S. government,
given their oversight of ICANN.
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ment versus international cooperation approach to problems on the
Internet, but shows that legislatures are prepared to regulate on technical matters, even where questions of freedom of speech may be involved.
The ACPA and the UDRP highlight the usefulness of in-kind remedies,
particularly using the relatively centralized architecture of the domain
name system. This provides a means for rapid and effective enforcement,
but its limits must be kept in mind. Each jurisdiction controls its own
ccTLDs, and while no government outside the U.S. can regulate gTLDs,
U.S. control is subject to tacit international consent.
Heeding these lessons, it seems that in-kind regulation is the most
attractive option, provided that the effect of extra-jurisdictional actors
can be nullified. Although the Internet is frequently referred to as
borderless, the natural geographic boundaries of the Internet have been
recognized in a number of areas. Sub-networks can be useful in targeting
regulation, whether at an internet service provider ("ISP")1 19 or a national level. 120 Moreover, ccTLDs carve out national spaces on the Internet, effectively independent of ICANN. IP addresses can be used to
determine geographical origin with remarkable accuracy. 12 1 In less technical ways, language, culture, and user norms also demarcate geographically-rooted portions of the Internet. 122 The difficulty, then, is in
matching national jurisdiction to in-kind enforcement in an effective
manner. The key is finding, or creating, a virtual border which coincides
with the limit of effective powers of enforcement. A scheme based on just
such a border is proposed in Part V below.
V. A PROPOSAL - THE CLEAN WEB ACT
The proposal contained in this part is for a piece of legislation
targeted at unclean metadata. For want of a catchy name - and distancing the author from the acronyism 12 3 of recent pieces of U.S. legislation the Clean Web Act is proposed. The Clean Web Act would not prohibit
the use of unclean metadata on the Web. Instead, it would allow authors
to guarantee that their metadata is clean on a voluntary basis. By including a guarantee on their page, authors would expose themselves to
sanctions if the metadata they provided was in fact not clean. Search
engines and other applications would then limit their reliance on
119. Biegel, supra n. 43, at 218-19.
120. Goldsmith & Wu, supra n. 22, at 3-9, 87-104 (discussing on a French court's effective judgment against Yahoo! and then discussing China's censorship efforts based on the
structure of its carefully architected national network).
121. Id. at 58-62.
122. Id. at 50-53.
123. Acronyism, n. the flagrant abuse of acronyms to garner support, particularly popular in the United States around the turn of the century. See the USA PATRIOT Act, the
CAN-SPAM Act, the TEACH Act, the PROTECT Act and the proposed US SAFE WEB Act.
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metadata to those sites which guarantee the accuracy of their metadata
and are in a jurisdiction in which that guarantee is credible. Enforcement would be primarily via DNS, and would be backed by civil
penalties.
A.

UNCLEAN METADATA

Any number of reasonable definitions of unclean metadata may be
given. Unclean metadata might be defined, as it is in this paper, as
metadata which is false, inaccurate or misleading. Alternatively, the criteria applied to deceptive subject headings in e-mail used in CAN-SPAM
could be adapted for use here: actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that the metadata would be
likely to mislead a person or computer, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the Web page.124 The primary danger in this definition is excessive
narrowness. For instance, the simple term 'false' may be not be sufficient to cover all undesirable metadata. Whatever definition is adopted,
a jurisprudence based on analogous areas, such as trade practices, is
sure to develop to delimit the boundary between clean and unclean
metadata more exactly.
B.

THE GUARANTEE

The use of a guarantee makes participation voluntary. This voluntariness is a very appealing characteristic because it places only the most
minor restriction on what can be done on the Web. The best way in which
to allow authors to guarantee the cleanness of the metadata contained in
their Web page is to embed the guarantee itself as metadata. 12 5 This
could be read by search engines and browsers alike, and would not interfere with the functionality of the Web at all. 126 If the guarantee was present, search engines, or indeed, any application which has a use for the
metadata, 12 7 could treat the metadata as authoritative and trustwor124. 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (a)(2) (2006 (emphasis added).
125. For example, as a HTML tag such as <meta name="CleanWebAct"value="guarantee"/>.
126. World Wide Web Consortium, User Agent Conformance, http://www.w3.org/TR/
xhtmll/#uaconf (accessed April 26, 2006) (The HTML standard requires that tags which
are not understood be ignored. Many Web pages already contain metadata which is not
relevant to Web browsers, such as information on versioning and authorship used by the
author to manage the content, and tags which cannot be understood by all browsers, such
as frames).
127. For example, browsers might use the metadata to annotate the user's browsing
history, to allow the user's browsing history to be searched or to organise documents which
have been viewed together in conceptual groups (a kind of automatic bookmarking).
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thy. 1 28 Penalties would be imposed upon those presenting guarantees
but not complying with them.
Moreover, assuming for the moment that enforceable penalties are
available, search engines can limit their trust of guarantees to those
sites which are in jurisdictions which effectively enforce compliance with
such guarantees. For example, if the United States and Australia had
enacted this kind of legislation, and were effectively enforcing compliance with it, search engines utilizing metadata would limit their
searches to Web pages which fulfilled two conditions: they contained the
guarantee of cleanness and they were in the '.us' or '.au' ccTLDs. The
decision on the reliability of any particular jurisdiction would be made by
the search engine or application in question. 12 9 This allows the legislation to be effective whether enacted in one jurisdiction or all, and provides an impetus for jurisdictions to enact and enforce the system in
order that sites within their ccTLDs might be included in metadatabased searches.
C.

PENALTIES

DNS provides the most attractive enforcement mechanism for this
scheme. If a Web site is non-compliant, that is, it provides a guarantee
but has unclean metadata, its domain name would be forfeited, effectively removing it from the Web. 130 This is a simple, low cost, and effective penalty available to all countries against Web sites with domain
names in their ccTLDs. Furthermore, it is exercisable against all Web
sites, whether the author or owner is in the regulating jurisdiction or
not.
It is arguable that the benefit gained from having a Web site listed
highly in the results of popular searches even temporarily would be
worth the sacrifice of a domain name. A domain name might be bought
for the sole purpose of attracting a burst of traffic in order to redirect
users to a valid site or display advertising. The best solution to this problem is to limit the registration of domain names in each ccTLD to those
with a presence in the jurisdiction. 1 3 1 This is the case in some ccTLDs
128. S Bellovin, RFC 3514: The Security Flag in the IPv4 Header, http://www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc3514.txt (accessed April 19, 2006) (This may remind Internet-savvy readers of the
famous 'evil bit' RFC, requiring that malicious communications identify themselves in order that they may be efficiently intercepted by security devices).
129. It would seem likely that authorities, either formal or informal, would develop rating systems and make pronouncements on the levels of compliance in various jurisdictions.
130. The Web site would still be accessible via its IP address, but that has little bearing
on the effectiveness of the sanction.
131. This might seem quite a restrictive condition, but it is hardly unfair. The very purpose of ccTLDs is to allow Web sites to identify themselves with a particular geographic
area. Those who wish to obtain a domain name in a particular country but do not have the
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already. 13 2 With this limitation in place, civil or even criminal penalties
13 3
could be used to further deter blatant or repeat violations.

D.

ENFORCEMENT

Responsibility for enforcement is best placed in the hands of a government agency. Existing agencies, especially those charged with monitoring deceptive advertising and other unfair trade practices, may be
well-placed to take on such a role. 13 4 A government agency would collect
information on breaches of the legislation from a wide variety of sources
in order to act against offenders. Users of search engines could be provided with simple tools for providing feedback where they believe a
page's metadata is not accurate, based on its lack of relevance to their
search. 13 5 Where a sufficient number of reports were made, search engines could automatically forward information to the agency. Many companies watch their search rankings very closely, and would be able to
provide information on violations to the agency. Search engines already
appear to have tools for monitoring this kind of abuse. 136 The agency
could run a Web crawling robot which compares page content to
required presence could use agents to register the appropriate domains, indemnifying them
against penalties. Some countries may choose to expand registration to parties in other
countries with whom they have reciprocal enforcement agreements.
132. See e.g. auDA, CurrentauDA PublishedPolicies, http://www.auda.com.aupolicies/
(accessed April 12, 2006) (Australia, for instance, already has such a restriction for all of its
ccTLDs; Domain name licences may only be allocated to a registrant who is Australian, as
defined under the eligibility and allocation rules for each 2LD, [such as .com.au or
.edu.au]."); CIRA, Policy Development Process, http://www.cira.ca/encatRegistrar.html
(accessed April 12, 2006) (for Canada's similar provisions); NeuStar.Inc., The usTLD Nexus
Requirements, http://www.neustar.us/policies/docs/ustldnexus-requirements.pdf (accessed
April 12, 2006) (Although not strictly a ccTLD, the .us gTLD has a nexus requirement
which requires that the registrant be a person resident in the U.S., a U.S. entity or organization or a foreign entity or organization which has a 'bona fide' presence in the U.S.).
133. Anonymity would not appear to be a great difficulty. If the contact information in
the registry proves inaccurate - and it shouldn't given that registrars need to verify that
the registrant has sufficient connection to the ccTLD in question - forfeiture would be automatic and investigation aimed at imposing more serious penalties could proceed based on
the means of payment for the domain, the content of the Web site and the location of the
host computer.
134. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2206) (Yhe FTC is perfectly placed to carry out such a
role, based on the mandate which states, lulnfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.").
135. Feedback could be given to the search engine via a simple link named "irrelevant"
displayed beside each link in a search engine's results, or directly to the agency by way of a
button in the browser pressed with the offending page loaded.
136. BBC News, BMW Given Google "Death Penalty", http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
technology/4685750.stm (accessed April 26, 2006); Tom Espiner, Google Blacklists
BMW.de, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009 22-6035412.html (accessed April 26, 2006).
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metadata in order to identify potential breaches. 13 7
E.

VARIATIONS AND EXTENSIONS

One interesting variation is the use of software for the generation of
keywords. One piece of metadata would be reserved for the output of
software which analyzes the Web page. That metadata would then be
assessed as clean if it matched the output of the software, allowing the
automation of compliance monitoring. This could be used in addition to
human-authored metadata, and it is easily extended to allow a number
138
of pieces of software to be used.
However, this introduces a number of problems. First, this would
encourage Web site owners to design Web pages to produce a certain set
of metadata, recreating the technological arms race of software writers
versus Web page authors, which has led to the problem at hand. Second,
each piece of software would have to be optimized for a particular type of
page, academic papers or news articles for instance. Otherwise, there is
no reason to believe that a variation of the scheme with software-produced metadata could be any more effective than existing search
39

engines.1

This is only one example of how a platform for clean metadata could
be built upon by custom applications. Allowing the reservation of certain
metadata tags for particular purposes - in the manner of port numbers would encourage standardization and interoperability and allow
innovation.140

137. See Whatis?.com, Look It Up, Crawler, http://whatis.techtarget.com/whome/0,
289825,sid9,00.html (accessed oct. 15, 2007) ("Crawler is a program that visits Web sites
and reads their pages and other information in order to create entries for a search engine
index.").
138. See Lessig, supra n. 34, at 100-108. For example, if the FTC were to supply a
metadata generation tool, it would reserve the use of a tag such as <meta name=
"autowords"value="FTC">traffic monitoring enforcement speed limits</meta>. Other
software providers could reserve other values, such as <meta name="autowords" value=
"Google">... </meta>. This would allow a competitive market for the use of such software to
emerge, resulting in a market-selected standard. Lessig's comments about the benefits of
open code, especially in terms of transparency, bear consideration here. A positive and not
unlikely result is the emergence of a cooperatively developed standard tool from the technical community.
139. However, the metadata would be distributed rather than centralized, realizing the
benefits discussed previously. Supra, pt. II (discussing the impact of claen metadata in the
search space).
140. Infra, pt. VI (discussing the probabilities of success).
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CHALLENGES AND ASSESSMENT
LEVEL DOMAINS AND HOSTS WITHOUT DOMAIN

NAMES

The scheme outlined above is based solely upon ccTLDs, excluding
both gTLDs and hosts without domain names from offering guarantees
of clean metadata. With respect to gTLDs, this problem can be dealt with
in at least four ways. First, as highlighted by the ACPA, the U.S. can
regulate this namespace. In order to be effective, however, the U.S.
would have to limit registrations to persons within its jurisdiction. This
would be highly contentious as gTLDs are seen as global addresses. Second, gTLDs could be abolished, leaving only ccTLDs. This too would be
controversial in light of the value presently assigned to such domains.
Thirdly, gTLDs could simply be excluded from the system, leaving sites
with those types of domain names unable to offer guarantees of clean
metadata. However, that would prevent participation by a very large and
14 1
important set of Web sites.
Finally, gTLDs could be included in the system by way of representations from sites located in regulated ccTLDs. If a site with a domain
name in a gTLD wished to give a metadata guarantee, it would have to
obtain a domain name in a ccTLD. This is not a difficult requirement to
comply with, as a single Web site may have multiple domain names. The
site's guarantee would then include a list of sites to which it wishes to
extend its guarantee of clean metadata - sites for which it takes responsibility. 142 While the simplest scenario is offering a guarantee for the
same site accessed via its gTLD name, guarantees could be extended to
mirrors in unregulated ccTLDs or even completely unrelated sites. Hosts
without domain names could be included in the same manner. Allowing
sites to warrant the cleanness of other sites' metadata allows the system
to be extended to gTLDs and unregulated ccTLDs without compromising
the global nature of the former or the independence of the latter.
B.

ICANN

IS AN INAPPROPRIATE REGULATORY TOOL

There have been strong arguments made against the use of ICANN
as a policy-based regulator. These arguments focus on ICANN's lack of
democratic legitimacy as well as international suspicion, and they are
persuasive. ICANN is a technical body; its mandate, and indeed its continued existence, is premised upon its role being restricted to ensuring
that DNS functions. It is therefore a strength of the proposed scheme
141. Caslon Analytics, supra n. 108 (Almost two-thirds of all existing domain names
were gTLDs in 2003. Their commercial significance gives them even greater importance.).
142. In addition, the site receiving the guarantee would have to include a reference to
the site giving the guarantee so that those viewing the receiving site can go and verify the
existence of the guarantee.
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that it does not rely upon ICANN for enforcement. Each jurisdiction is
capable of regulating its own ccTLDs by imposing requirements on
whatever entity runs its registry. This is not a scheme in which centralization of power in the root server is used to create an international autocracy. It is a scheme in which national governments exercise their
power to regulate their own jurisdictions in the most effective manner
possible.
C.

THIRD PARTY SPEECH

Many Web sites do not have control over all of the pages which are
published on sites using their domain name. Examples include blog hosting sites and free Web hosts. 143 If a client of the Web site owner offered a
guarantee on their Web page, the site owner, as the owner of the domain
name, would be liable for any inaccuracy. This problem can be solved by
employing an existing mechanism. At present, search engines check for a
file named 'robots.txt' on each site which they index. 1 44 It is found in a
standard location, at the root of the site. 145 This file contains instructions from the site operator indicating which parts of the site are to be
indexed and which are not. A similar scheme, or an expansion of the
information in robots.txt, could be introduced for the meta-guarantee to
indicate that guarantees are not reliable for certain parts of the site.
This would prevent third parties from rendering the Web site owners
who host their Web pages liable for failure to comply with a guarantee.
D.

NON-PARTICIPATION AND NON-COMPLIANCE

This kind of scheme exhibits network effects: "the value of [the] system... to its users tends to increase as other users adopt the same system." 146 As such, it needs to reach a critical mass of use in order to
survive, but after that critical mass has been reached, the network effects encourage universal adoption.' 47 For this scheme, it might be said
that there is little incentive in exposing oneself to the risk of sanctions if
search engines are not utilizing the metadata; but search engines will
not invest in the development necessary to rely on the metadata until
143. Interactive sites, such as those on which users can post comments, do not suffer
from the same problem. Comments are published in the body of a Web page (the part which
contains the content of the page), whereas the guarantee would be located in the head
section of the page (separate from and preceding the body), meaning that users cannot
insert a guarantee in their comments.
144. See The Web Robots Pages, A Standardfor Robot Exclusion, http://www.robotstxt.
org/wc/norobots.html (accessed April 26, 2006) (In fact, this practice is not encapsulated in
an informal standard, although major search engines generally respect it.).
145. See e.g. http://www.google.com/robots.txt (accessed April 26, 2006).
146. Milton Mueller, supra n. 94, at 52.
147. Id. at 53.
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guarantees are sufficiently widespread to make them useful. In the early
stages of adoption, a certain number of parties need to invest in the technology either altruistically or with a view to the long-term benefits.
Often an outside impetus such as a subsidy is necessary in order to reach
1 48
the critical mass.
Failure to reach critical mass is a risk in the implementation of this
scheme, but it is not a major obstacle. First, there are no competing standards in this case. The choice is between non-participation and participation, and legitimate Web publishers would perceive the benefit of
improved findability that is gained through participation. Second, compliance is a simple matter for most Web publishers, who would not have
unclean metadata on their pages in the first place. Third, the discouraging effect of the risk of sanction can be minimized by taking a lighthanded approach to enforcement initially. Fourth, the investment required to utilize clean metadata is almost trivial. A search engine relying
on clean metadata could be implemented by a group of computer science
students without difficulty. 149 Fifth, adoption can begin in sub-communities such as academic circles, reducing the scale of operation of the
search. With a reduced scale, the cost of search would be lower, and each
sub-community would have its own, much lower critical mass. Sixth, if
attaining critical mass proves difficult in spite of all these factors, the
government could mandate use of the scheme and provision of a search
engine by its various agencies. The cost of compliance with such a requirement would be insignificant as government agencies would
presumedly not use unclean metadata.
Note, however, that these factors would only become relevant if the
legislation was not warmly received initially. If there was doubt as to the
usefulness of clean metadata or the potential efficacy of the scheme, Web
site owners might take a wait and see approach. However, if the Web
community believed in the benefits of clean metadata and the capacity of
this proposal to guarantee it, the achievement of critical mass would be a
foregone conclusion. The mere proposal of this kind of legislation would
generate comment and controversy amongst technologists and Web developers. Its likelihood of success would have been debated at length
before its formal commencement. Critical mass would then be a question
of popular support based upon belief in the likely efficacy of the legislation, defaulting to gradual adoption based upon individual benefit if popular commitment is initially absent.
148. Id. at 83-85.
149. Obviously there are degrees of sophistication,
fledged search engine would require a more significant
success of information technology icons such as Google,
entrepreneurial developers or funding would be difficult

and the development of a fully
investment. However, given the
it is hard to believe that either
to find.
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Assuming that a critical mass is achievable, the problem switches
from lack of participation to overwhelming non-compliant participation.
A culture of non-compliance is avoided by making the scheme voluntary,
but the credibility of the scheme could be undermined by a large number
of Web sites blatantly abusing the system. The key here is clearly effective and persistent enforcement. Whereas a light-handed approach
might be applied to those who appear to have inadvertently breached the
guarantee in its early days, a much stricter approach ought to be taken
to those who blatantly abuse the guarantee after it has reached a critical
mass. Also, in the search domain, the area where clean metadata would
be most immediately useful, targeted searches will exclude sites which
use too much metadata. For example, a researcher looking for academic
articles and trying to avoid commercial Web sites might require that the
metadata not include the word "shop." A publisher who has misleadingly
included the word "shop" will then be excluded from this search. This
discourages over-indulgence in the use of metadata, as metadata can be
used to exclude as well as include.
E.

THE DIFFICULTY OF JUDGMENT

Undeniably, there is potential for difficult cases in assessing the
cleanness of metadata. However, this is not a legitimate reason to reject
the whole scheme. Both the judiciary and the executive make difficult
judgments on a daily basis. A wide variety of laws allow for circumstances of dubious legality. Our courts have centuries of experience in
resolving exactly these types of issues. Moreover, they do it transparently and accountably, subject to the checks and balances of public
power. They can clarify and refine the law, taking into account the various interests which emerge through conflict. This is a far superior alternative to leaving these judgments in the hands of private companies,
operating behind closed doors and with no binding rules.
Furthermore, when considering the use of clean metadata as a platform, many of its applications will not require hard judgments as to accuracy. Only where the metadata is determined by human interpretation of
content will there be the possibility of contention; where metadata is
used in a way that is not dependent on human judgment, there is no
room for debate. There is no possibility of difficult cases where metadata
. 50
is generated by machine analysis, rule or formula 1
150. A good example is the hotel search engine described below under "H. Probabilities
of Success." In that case the metadata in question is a summary of hotel room features,
prices and availability. The accuracy of the metadata is determinable trivially and without
room for controversy.
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FREE SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATION

While free speech advocates might be placated by the voluntary nature of this scheme, Internet libertarians might argue that it divides information into classes: trustworthy and untrustworthy. Those who are
unable to give a guarantee, whether because they do not own the domain
name on which they publish or because they cannot risk the sanctions,
are relegated to relative obscurity. 15 1 That argument might be extended
to suggest that metadata guarantees could be a tool for censorship or
propaganda. Information agreeable to the government is given trusted
status; dissent must remain untrustworthy, lest the publisher be pursued by the government.
In response, one might point to the fact that the proposed scheme is
not centralized in any way. There is no authority which has to be satisfied before a guarantee can be given. Even in enforcement, authority is
distributed internationally, rather than being concentrated in one institution or agency. A page which is shut down in one jurisdiction can be
posted by another site owner in another jurisdiction without fear of being
pursued by the same authority. Jurisdictions which regulate metadata
for political ends will quickly cease to be trusted by users. Where a government is prepared to use metadata regulation to suppress views, the
effect is likely to be trivial in comparison to the impact of the direct censorship which that government is engaged in. Then as now, the results of
a search for "Tiananmen Square" on a Chinese search engine would not
be expected to be impartial. This leads on to a more complete answer to
this criticism.
Trust already operates as an informal filter on the Web. Users assess information based on the nature of its source. News from the New
York Times is considered more authoritative than the ramblings of a
soapboxing citizen. Credit card information is given to Dell Corporation
far less reticently than it is given to Joe's Computer Shop, no fixed address. Web users link authenticity and credibility to accountability. The
New York Times is accountable; Joe's computer shop is not. To a Web
user in the U.S., a U.S. company might be more accountable than a
Nigerian one. The proposed scheme simply formalizes trust derived from
accountability in a way which allows it to be utilized by search engines.
Indeed, it is more egalitarian than simply relying on known brand names
or institutions, as the meta-guarantee of Joe's Computer Shop is
151. Infra, pt. VI (discussing howe the extensibility of the Web is not effected). This
argument is flawed to the extent that the existing mechanisms of the Web - current search
engines, for example - are not compromised in any way by the proposed scheme. The reference to 'relative obscurity' is somewhat misleading - the sites might be less findable in
some respects than those offering a metadata guarantee, but they would still be as findable
as they are presently.

CLEANING METADATA ON THE WEB

2006]

equivalent to the meta-guarantee of Dell Corporation. In addition, trust
and authority are closely tied to findability, 15 2 and democratized search
democratizes findability.
G.

EXTENSIBILITY: THE WEB IS NOT EFFECTED

One highly favorable characteristic of the proposed scheme is its extensibility, in both of the senses described above. First, it does not limit
the functionality of the Web in any way. Just as the cost of compliance to
individual parties is nil, the cost to the public in terms of loss of facility
or potential in the Web is nil. This is a powerful counter-argument to
claims of infringement upon free speech and undue restrictiveness. The
market is free to vote with its feet. Failure costs the public nothing, and
will surely provide insights into future regulation of the Internet. 153 The
Web is not being upgraded to a new model, more desirable to government
or commerce; rather an extension is being offered - one might say a new
layer is being added 15 4 - leaving users free to make a choice whether to
utilize it or not.
The proposal at hand seeks to bring clean metadata to the Web by
imbuing a particular artifact in code - the guarantee expressed in
metadata - with legal significance. Although the effect is through code,
and code is generally considered to be the architecture of the Internet,15 5
giving legal significance to a statement in code in this way is not a
change to the architecture of the Internet. While almost all of the architecture of the Internet is code, not all code is architecture. The architecture of the Internet is made up of layers: at the bottom is hardware,
controlled by code; at the top is code, running on hardware. But on top of
this architecture, there can be more code still, not defining the space but
rather acting as the medium of interaction with it. Here, code is relevant
not as architecture but as a manifestation of the actions of persons in the
regulated space. Code is a way to make a promise, and law regulates by
giving the promise consequences.
Regulation which does not require restrictive changes to the architecture enables choice. That is the point made in the introduction to this
paper - this scheme is about helping users of the Web find the Web they
are looking for. The Web is infinitely multi-faceted, and the scheme proposed above does nothing to limit that. The proposed scheme simply adds
a new facet. Better said, it adds an infinite set of new facets, novel be152. Morville, supra n. 2, at 157.
153. There is, of course, a cost to the administration in the lost efforts setting up the
appropriate regulatory agencies and other executive modifications necessary to implement
the laws; but laws change frequently enough that this is little more than the cost of government in the normal course.
154. Wu, supra n. 32, at 1189-92.
155. Lessig, supra n. 34, at 85-99.
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cause they can operate upon clean metadata. This may be more useful in
some fields than in others. Considering search alone, some searches
might be better made using existing tools. However, some will benefit
from separate traditional and metadata-based searches, and some will
utilize tools which combine traditional and metadata-based approaches.
Certain areas might be best searched using only metadata-based
tools.156

This segues neatly into the second type of extensibility discussed
above, the applicability of the scheme itself for different purposes. The
manner in which clean metadata would be provided is amenable to use
for a variety of purposes, as a platform for any number of uses besides
search. A government agency could publish a standard for metadata
used in a particular niche market, relying on the established system of
guarantees to prosecute those who abuse the standard by offering inaccurate metadata. Better yet, any private or public body could do the
same, without needing formal powers of proclamation or regulation, as
abusing a published standard would clearly constitute providing unclean
metadata. If further regulation is needed, the scheme serves as a model
for other regulatory efforts.
H.

PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS

With virtually no cost of failure and a considerable potential dividend, the only rational argument against implementing the proposed
scheme is the belief that its failure is a foregone conclusion. Against that,
one can do little more than to point to the detailed examination of potential obstacles undertaken above. All that is needed is political will. In
light of successful campaigns for legislation against spam, 15 7 that is certainly achievable. Indeed, given the willingness to regulate evidenced by
anti-spam legislation, there is reason to believe that the political capital
realizable from a successful exercise of regulatory power on the Web will
be enough to inspire legislators. 158 However, in case a little more illustration is needed, below is an example of the manner in which the proposed scheme could become established and useful, assuming its
enactment by a national legislature.
First, academics in specialist fields begin to annotate their Web sites
using metadata to enable colleagues and students to better locate relevant research. Adopting the Dublin Core schema, information scientists
156. See Morville, supra n. 2, at 48-54, 139-41 (discussing different measures of effectiveness in information retrieval and addressing the layering of technologies, combining
advantages, and allowing user choice, as "the genius of the AND").
157. See supran. 84 and accompanying text (Successful in the sense that legislation was
enacted, not that spain was stopped, or even reduced.).
158. See supra n. 88 and accompanying text (Especially considering that the problem
can be cast in terms of pornography.).
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and librarians lead the way, realizing that actions speak louder than
words (even perfectly classified words). A small team of undergraduate
information science students develop a simple search engine using
Boolean queries to index these resources. 159 Other small research groups
follow suit, creating pockets of guaranteed clean metadata in academic
16 0
corners of the Web accessed using custom search tools.
A graduate researcher proposes to the National Hoteliers' Association, say, that all its members be encouraged to use a metadata schema
which he has created to describe hotel rooms. 16 1 The association can
then provide an authoritative search tool for finding hotel rooms, saving
members the costs of advertising on other search engines. Smaller hotels, invisible on regular search engines, flock to the idea. Although the
NHA declines to fund the search engine - established interests being
what they are - the researcher believes in the idea enough to establish
Hoogle. Similar operations pop up in other niches, gradually but inevitably bringing guaranteed clean metadata to the commercial Web.
As momentum builds, regular search companies begin to take notice
of this new force. They begin to allow users to include metadata as an
influence on search results, and establish alternative tools for metadatabased searching. Clean metadata has gone mainstream, and the result is
a wave of fraudulent Web sites using deceptive metadata to attract traffic. The government agency in charge responds with a wave of domain
name forfeitures, prompting a number of court cases (although the majority of offenders do not contest their penalties). The predictability of
enforcement is improved as parties are made more aware of the limits of
the law, bringing formerly hesitant Web site authors into the fold. Seeing
the success of the scheme in this jurisdiction, other countries enact similar legislation, seeking to foster local Web-related innovation. Guaranteed clean metadata becomes part of the global Web infrastructure.
159. The technology required is proven and well-known; it simply needs to be applied to
the problem at hand. More than likely, an existing, freely available piece of software could
be adapted to serve such a purpose.
160. See Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, People involved in the Dublin Core Metadata
Initiative, http://dublincore.orglabout/participants/ (accessed April 17, 2006) (listing the
kinds of parties already involved in metadata-related activities). Given that educational
institutions are trying to foster the growth of knowledge, that effective search is so important in research, and that academics tend to be early adopters of new technology, it is
highly likely that this kind of scheme would be embraced at universities. Universities (the
institutions themselves) and academics are not parties with an incentive to publish unclean metadata. Some already publish clean metadata. Government bodies are in a similar
position.
161. For example, <meta name="NHA:stars"value="4"/><meta name="NHA:price"
value="300"/>. Any number of alternative implementations exist, such as nesting data
within a single meta tag.
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CONCLUSION

It seems clear that the establishment of a system of regulation to
ensure clean metadata on the Web is both feasible and worthwhile. The
proposal explored above accounts for the challenges of Internet regulation by tying the scheme to national top-level domains, known as
ccTLDs. Doing so secures its enforceability, giving credibility to Web site
owners' guarantees as to the cleanness of their metadata. This allows the
realization of the myriad benefits of clean metadata within national jurisdictions that implement and enforce such legislation. Better search faster and more democratic - is an important benefit, but it may merely
be the beginning. The true potential of clean metadata could come as a
platform for innovation, for visions as grand as the Semantic Web.
By finding a way to regulate behaviors on the Web without altering
its architecture, we can introduce the benefits of regulation - the stability and predictability valued by individuals and commerce alike - without sacrificing the flexibility and freedom that have made the Web what
it is. We can extend the Web, allowing users to find the Web that they
are looking for. And while legislation bringing clean metadata to the
Web could be an important step in bringing the Web to its full potential,
it could be more significant still as the start of a habit of regulation of the
Internet which is explicit, direct, facilitative, application-specific, creative, and informed.

